
Documents

Considering the Evidence: Debating Development in Africa



Nowhere were the expectations for national independence greater than in Africa during the 1950s through the 1970s as country after country broke free from colonial rule. “We shall achieve in a decade what it took others a century,” declared Kwame Nkrumah, who had led Ghana to freedom in 1957 as black Africa’s first independent country. “[W]e shall not rest content until we demolish these miserable colonial structures and erect in their place a veritable paradise.”⁹ But nowhere have the disappointments of the postindependence era been more acute than in Africa. Despite some scattered successes, Africa after independence experienced the slowest rate of economic growth among the various regions of the developing world. Famine, civil war, genocide, failed states, endemic corruption, the AIDS epidemic, massive poverty, frequent military coups—all of this and more accompanied, and surely contributed to, the economic disappointments of the past half-century.

Such conditions have generated a sharp debate about development among African political and intellectual leaders as well as among disillusioned citizens. Why have African nations performed so poorly in improving the living standards of their impoverished people? What strategies should African states adopt in their continuing search for development? The documents presented here offer a sample of African thinking about development.

Document 23.1

The Colonial Legacy for Modern Development

The starting point for much discussion about African development is the legacy of colonial rule. How well or how poorly had the colonial experience prepared these new countries for modern economic development? To varying degrees, most recent African assessments have been highly critical, even while acknowledging some positive developments. One such account comes from the well-known Ghanaian historian A. Adu Boahen. He recognized some benefits of colonial rule: a measure of “peace and stability” for a time; “an infrastructure of roads, railways, harbors”; the “spread of cash crop agriculture . . . and western education”; and opportunities for social mobility. But the overall thrust of his judgment was negative.

- What were Boahen's chief criticisms of the colonial economy?
- What problems or challenges did the colonial economic legacy present to newly independent states?
- How might European defenders of colonial rule respond to Boahen's critique?
- How does Boahen's assessment of colonial rule in Africa compare to that of Indian critics of colonial rule as reflected in Documents 20.3, 20.4, and 20.5?

A. ADU BOAHEN

African Perspectives on Colonialism

1987

Had African states been in control of their own destinies—as say, Japan was...—there is no reason why...they could not also have followed the Japanese model, as indeed some of their educated sons...were advocating... It is in this loss of sovereignty and the consequent isolation from the outside world that one finds one of the most pernicious impacts of colonialism on Africa and one of the fundamental causes of its present underdevelopment and technological backwardness...

The transportation and communication infrastructure that was provided [by colonial rule] was not only inadequate but was also very unevenly distributed... The roads and railways were by and large constructed to link areas with the potential for cash crops and mineral deposits with the sea or the world commodity market. [They] were meant to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources, but not to promote...the development of all regions of the colony. The outcome...has been uneven regional economic development...

[T]he colonial system led to the delay of industrial and technological developments in Africa... One of the typical features of the colonial political economy was the total neglect of

industrialization and of the processing of locally produced raw materials and agricultural products in the colonies... [P]reexisting industries were almost all eradicated by the importation of cheap and even better substitutes from Europe and India... This... further explains Africa's present technological backwardness...

[C]olonialism saddled most colonies with monocrop economies... Each colony was made to produce a single cash crop or two, and no attempts were made to diversify the agricultural economy... The other consequence of this concentration on the production of cash crops for export was the neglect of the internal sector of the economy and, in particular, of the production of food for internal consumption. Thus, during the colonial period, Africans were encouraged to produce what they did not consume and to consume what they did not produce, a clear proof of the exploitative nature of the colonial political economy...

Colonialism also put an end to inter-African trade... The new artificial boundaries not only divided peoples but also blocked the centuries-old transregional and regional caravan routes... The flow of trade in each colony was now oriented to the relevant metropolitan country...

[A]ll the colonial currencies were tied to those of the metropolitan countries, and all their foreign exchange earnings were kept in the metropolitan countries and not used for internal development.

Source: A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 99–108.

The expatriate commercial banks and companies were also allowed to repatriate their deposits, savings, and profits instead of reinvesting them in the colonies for further development. The consequence of all this was that at the time of independence, no African state apart from the Union of South Africa had the strong economic or industrial base needed for a real economic takeoff. . . .

[I]t was the colonial system that initiated the gap that still exists between the urban and rural areas. All of the modern facilities—schools, hospitals, street lights, radio, postal services—and above all most of the employment opportunities were concentrated in the urban centers. The combination of modern life and employment pulled rural dwellers, especially the young one and those with schooling, in the direction of the cities.

[T]he social services provided by colonialism were grossly inadequate and unevenly distributed. . . . University education was totally ignored in all the colonies until the 1940s, and only one university was subsequently established for each colony. . . . In practically every colony only a very small percentage of school-age children could gain admission into schools. . . .

The effects of colonial education were really unfortunate. . . . Because of its inadequacy, large numbers of Africans remained illiterate. . . . The elite produced by these colonial educational institutions were with few exceptions people who were alienated from their own society in terms of their dress, outlook, and tastes in food, music, and even

dance. They were people who worshiped European culture and looked down on their own culture. . . .

Another negative social impact of colonialism was the downgrading of the status of women in Africa. . . . [T]here were far fewer facilities for girls than for boys. Women could not therefore gain access into the professions. . . . The colonial world was definitely a man's world, and women were not allowed to play any meaningful role in it except as petty traders and farmers.

The colonial administrators and their allies, the European missionaries, condemned everything African in culture—African names, music, dance, art, religion, marriage, the system of inheritance—and completely discouraged the teaching of these things in their schools and colleges. . . .

[This has resulted in] the creation of a colonial mentality among educated Africans in particular and also among the populace in general. This mentality manifests itself in the condemnation of anything traditional, in the preference for imported goods to locally manufactured goods (since independence), and in the style of dress—such as the wearing of three piece suits in a climate where temperatures routinely exceed eighty degrees Fahrenheit. Above all, it manifests itself in the belief. . . . that government and all public property and finance belong, not to the people, but to the colonial government, and could and should therefore be taken advantage of at the least opportunity, a belief which leads to the often reckless dissipation and misuse of public funds and property.

Document 23.2

Development and African Unity

One of the most important legacies of the colonial era was the African continent's division into more than fifty separate countries, many of them quite small. And yet the common experience of colonial rule and the sharp racial divisions of the colonial era had also given rise to the notion of an overall African identity, especially among educated people. As independence dawned across the continent, some leaders sought to translate that pan-African ideal into a concrete political and economic union. The chief spokesman for that idea in the early

years of independence was Ghana's nationalist leader and its first president, Kwame Nkrumah. He was convinced that only in union could the African continent achieve genuine and substantial economic development. Nkrumah's pan-African ideal has achieved some very modest successes in the form of several regional groupings of African states trying to coordinate their economic policies and in an African Union in which all African states seek to address common problems. But nothing approaching the kind of larger economic and political union that Nkrumah envisaged has emerged.

- Why did Nkrumah think that union was so essential? What benefits would it bring to Africa in its efforts at development?
- What kind of union did Nkrumah seek?
- What challenges does Nkrumah identify to his soaring vision of a United States of Africa? Which of these do you think was most daunting?
- Why do you think the thirteen separate colonies of British North America were able to form a United States of America in the late eighteenth century while their twentieth-century counterparts in Africa have not created a more substantial union?

KWAME NKROMAH

Africa Must Unite

1963

There are those who maintain that Africa cannot unite because we lack the three necessary ingredients for unity, a common race, culture, and language. It is true that we have for centuries been divided. The territorial boundaries dividing us were fixed long ago, often quite arbitrarily, by the colonial powers. Some of us are Moslems, some Christians; many believe in traditional, tribal gods. Some of us speak French, some English, some Portuguese, not to mention the millions who speak only one of the hundreds of different African languages. We have acquired cultural differences which affect our outlook and condition our political development. . . .

In the early flush of independence, some of the new African states are jealous of their sovereignty and tend to exaggerate their separatism in a historical

period that demands Africa's unity in order that their independence may be safeguarded. . . .

[A] united Africa—that is, the political and economic unification of the African Continent—should seek three objectives:

Firstly, we should have an overall economic planning on a continental basis. This would increase the industrial and economic power of Africa. So long as we remain balkanized, regionally or territorially, we shall be at the mercy of colonialism and imperialism. The lesson of the South American Republics vis-à-vis the strength and solidarity of the United States of America is there for all to see.

The resources of Africa can be used to the best advantage and the maximum benefit to all only if they are set within an overall framework of a continentally planned development. An overall economic plan, covering an Africa united on a continental basis, would increase our total industrial and economic

Source: Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963), 132, 148, 218–21.

power. We should therefore be thinking seriously now of ways and means of building up a Common Market of a United Africa and not allow ourselves to be lured by the dubious advantages of association with the so-called European Common market. . . .

Secondly, we should aim at the establishment of a unified military and defense strategy. . . .

For young African States, who are in great need of capital for internal development, it is ridiculous—indeed suicidal—for each State separately and individually to assume such a heavy burden of self-defense, when the weight of this burden could be easily lightened by sharing it among themselves. . . .

The third objective: [I]t will be necessary for us to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction to our joint efforts for the protection and economic development of our continent. . . . The burden of separate diplomatic

representation by each State on the Continent of Africa alone would be crushing, not to mention representation outside Africa. The desirability of a common foreign policy which will enable us to speak with one voice in the councils of the world, is so obvious, vital and imperative that comment is hardly necessary. . . .

Under a major political union of Africa there could emerge a United Africa, great and powerful, in which the territorial boundaries which are the relics of colonialism will become obsolete and superfluous, working for the complete and total mobilization of the economic planning organization under a unified political direction. The forces that unite us are far greater than the difficulties that divide us at present, and our goal must be the establishment of Africa's dignity, progress, and prosperity.

Document 23.3

Development, Socialism, and Self-Reliance

In the early postindependence decades, a number of African states expressed their plans for development in terms of socialism. After all, capitalism was associated with a despised colonial rule, and the communist countries of the Soviet Union and China had made significant economic progress within a socialist framework. One of the most prominent expressions of this socialist approach to development came from Tanzania, in East Africa. There Julius Nyerere, the country's nationalist leader and its first president, articulated a distinctly African and non-Marxist version of socialism, known as *ujamaa* (“familyhood” in the Swahili language). *Ujamaa* found expression in the nationalization of businesses and rental housing in the cities, while in the countryside socialist villages were supposed to encourage the cooperative working of the land and the creation of small local manufacturing industries. Document 23.3 presents excerpts from the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which spelled out the basic principles of *ujamaa* socialism.

- What kind of development does the declaration foresee for Tanzania?
- What criticisms does it make about other formulas for development?
- What is socialist about the Arusha Declaration? How does it differ from Marxist socialism (see Documents, Chapter 18, pp. 855–66)?

In an economic sense, ujamaa socialism in Tanzania was largely a failure and was later abandoned. Farmers herded into communal villages did not have much personal incentive to produce, and state-run businesses were inefficient and badly managed.

- What features of the Arusha Declaration might have contributed to this failure?

JULIUS NYERERE

The Arusha Declaration

1967

We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapons of the economically strong—weapons which in fact we do not possess. . . . It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor. It is . . . even more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign financial assistance rather than our own financial resources. . . .

We are mistaken when we imagine that we shall get money from foreign countries, firstly because, to say the truth, we cannot get enough money for our development and, secondly, because even if we could get it, such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our independence and the other policies of our country.

We have put too much emphasis on industries. . . . The mistake we are making is to think that development *begins* with industries. It is a mistake because we do not have the means to establish many modern industries in our country. We do not have either the necessary finances or the technical know-how. . . . And even if we could get the necessary assistance [from foreigners], dependence on it could interfere with our policy of socialism. The policy of inviting a chain of capitalists to come and establish industries in our country might succeed in giving us all the industries we need, but it would also succeed in pre-

venting the establishment of socialism unless we believe that without first building capitalism, we cannot build socialism.

Our emphasis on money and industries has made us concentrate on urban development. . . . The largest proportion of the [foreign] loans will be spent in, or for, the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the efforts of the farmers [through the sale of their agricultural products]. . . . We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become the exploiters of those who live in the rural areas. . . .

A great part of Tanzania's land is fertile and gets sufficient rains. Our country can produce various crops for home consumption and for export. We can produce food crops such as maize, rice, wheat, beans, and groundnuts. And we can produce such cash crops as sisal, cotton, coffee, tobacco, pyrethrum, and tea. Our land is also good for grazing cattle, goats, sheep, and for raising chickens; we can get plenty of fish from our rivers, lakes, and from the sea. . . . [O]ur purpose must be to increase production of these agricultural crops. This is in fact the only road through which we can develop our country. . . .

Everybody wants development, but not everybody understands and accepts the basic requirements for development. The biggest requirement is hard work. . . . In towns, for example, the average paid worker works . . . for 45 hours a week in 48 to 50 weeks a year.

For a country like ours, these are really quite short working hours. . . . By starting with such short

Source: From "The Policy of Self-Reliance: Excerpts from the Arusha Declaration of February 5, 1967," *Africa Report* (March 1967): 11–13.

working hours and asking for even shorter hours, we are in fact imitating the more developed countries. . . .

It would be appropriate to ask our farmers, especially the men, how many hours a week and how many weeks a year they work. Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage-earner does. The truth is that in the villages the women work very hard. At times they work for 12 or 14 hours a day. They even work on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages (and some of the women in towns) are on leave for half of their life. The energies of the millions of men in the villages and thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, dancing, and drinking, are a great treasure which could contribute more toward the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations. . . .

The second condition of development is the use of intelligence. Unintelligent hard work would not bring the same good results as the two combined. Using a big hoe instead of a small one; using a plough

pulled by oxen instead of an ordinary hoe; the use of fertilizers; the use of insecticides; knowing the right crop for a particular season or soil; choosing good seeds for planting; knowing the right time for planting, weeding, etc.; all these things show the use of knowledge and intelligence. And all of them combine with hard work to produce more and better results.

The money and time we spend on passing on this knowledge to the peasants are better spent and bring more benefits to our country than the money and the great amount of time we spend on other things which we call development. . . .

None of this means that from now on we will not need money or that we will not start industries or embark upon development projects which require money. . . . What we are saying, however, is that from now on we shall know what is the foundation and what is the fruit of development. Between *money* and *people* it is obvious that the people and their *hard work* are the foundation of development, and money is one of the fruits of that hard work. . . . This is the meaning of self-reliance.

Document 23.4

Development and Women

When deliberate planning for African economic development began in earnest following independence, it was focused almost wholly on men, for women had little presence in the modern sector of the economy toward which development was aimed. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, that was changing as scholars and policymakers alike focused more attention on the role of women in the modern development of African countries. In part, this was a consequence of international feminism, which turned the spotlight on issues of gender in all fields of study and practice. Furthermore, the importance of agriculture, in which African women were centrally involved, became increasingly apparent. This new perspective on development is reflected in a 1981 essay written by Mildred Malineo Tau from Lesotho in southern Africa, who was then her country's ambassador to the United States, Mexico, and Brazil.

- What obstacles to women's active participation in economic development does this document emphasize? How does Ambassador Tau understand the sources of sexual inequality?

- Why does Ambassador Tau believe that development planning should focus explicitly on the needs of women? How would attention to women alter the priorities of development planning?
- What features of Ambassador Tau's development plan might coincide with the priorities of the Arusha Declaration? In what respects might they differ?
- What do the visions of development laid out by Ambassador Tau and the Arusha Declaration tell us about the lives of women in modern Africa? Are these issues unique to Africa or are they common to women everywhere?

MILDRED MALINEO TAU

Women: Critical to African Development

1981

Women, especially rural women, are the core of development in most African countries. Most of them are faced with a disproportionate level of responsibility for which they are ill prepared. Development efforts have had the tendency to “plan *for* instead of *with* women.”

Recognition of the role of women in development is critical. There are many efforts to introduce women into the process of development, but these efforts must not be mere gestures to make them appear useful. . . .

One striking characteristic of African women is their multiplicity of roles. African women's contribution to an active involvement in subsistence farming and wage activities, their critical presence in marketing, food distribution networks, and their continued responsibilities as wives and mothers combine to make their role in the survival of the family and the community most important. . . . The majority of African women are engaged in agriculture.

Several factors have mitigated against developmental programs having a positive impact on these women. First, development planning has been based largely on male conceptualizations of life, which most often fail to take into account the activities of, and socioeconomic pressures impinging upon, women.

Second, they are often designed from an urban viewpoint rather than from an understanding of the dynamics of rural life.

The heavy dependence in Africa on subsistence agriculture, which is largely the province of women, makes policies affecting land, its distribution, and ownership critical to development. . . . Assuming that men were the primary factors in agricultural production, improved technology and training were offered to men, but not to women. . . .

[T]he increasing monetization of economies in developing countries puts an extra demand on women to raise cash for food, transportation, shelter, school fees, and household supplies. The opportunities for women's entry into the cash economy are severely limited, but it is they who need the cash since incidental cash earned by men is less likely to go into the basic needs of the family than that earned by women. . . . Improving their productive capacity even within these spheres of activity has been limited by their lack of access to training, intermediate and advanced technology, and capital resources.

. . . The long hours African women labor and the near impossibility of cutting out any of this work

Source: Mildred Malineo Tau, “Women: Critical to African Development,” *Africa Report* (March/April, 1981): 4–6.

which is so necessary for daily survival, hinder their ability to participate in development activities, take advantage of training, health services, political forums, etc.

Environmental conditions present in many African countries have imposed heavy burdens on women. Fetching water and collecting fuel can consume a large portion of a woman's time each day. Improving the productive capacity of women as a means of enhancing general development gains will need to include attention to access to water and fuel. . . .

Among the potential resources for development in Africa are a strong tradition of cooperative work and diverse and often strong women's organizations, both formal and informal. . . .

[W]omen may be denied credit as a policy of the bank although by law discrimination is prohibited.

We need support for projects which analyze existing legislation, monitor implementation, or disseminate information and education to grass-roots women on their legal rights and responsibilities.

The issue of women's access to wage work and other sources of cash income in the African continent is more than one of equity. It goes beyond the question of equal rights for women to become one of economic survival for them and their children. Because women in Africa are not secondary earners, neither ideologically nor in reality as are many women in Latin America, for example, but are providers of food, clothing, and shelter, their increased dependence on the monetary economy may have a more immediate negative impact on African women. If their role as main provider continues to go unacknowledged in development planning, the consequences could be serious.

Document 23.5

Development, Elites, and the State

In the aftermath of independence, many African explanations for the continent's mounting economic problems focused on external factors such as the colonial legacy and an unjust world economy dominated by the rich countries. Many argued that the solution to these problems lay in state control or direction of the economy. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, many African economies had deteriorated badly in sharp contrast to the growth patterns of Asian countries, such as South Korea, China, India, and Indonesia. In this context, a number of African intellectuals and some political leaders began to rethink the task of development with a more self-critical focus on the continent's internal problems and with a greater appreciation for the possibilities of private enterprise. Document 23.5, drawn from two of the writings by prominent Ghanaian economist George Ayittey in the 1990s, represents this line of thinking.

- How does Ayittey understand the major obstacles to development in Africa?
- How does he view the role of post-independence African elites and the states they govern?
- What prescriptions for African development are stated or implied in this document?
- In what ways might Ayittey's prescriptions for development be seen as a rejection of the ideas contained in the first three selections in this

feature? To what extent does his thinking build upon, or evolve from, those earlier ideas?

GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY

Africa Betrayed

1992

Africa in Chaos

1998

By the beginning of the 1990s economic and political conditions in Africa had become intolerable...

It is easy for African leaders to put the blame somewhere else; for example, on Western aid donors or on an allegedly hostile international economic environment, ... but in my view the internal factors have played far greater roles than the external ones.

True freedom never came to much of Africa after independence. Despite the rhetoric and vituperations against colonialism, very little changed in the years immediately following independence. For many countries independence meant only a change in the color of the administrators from white to black. The new leaders began to act in the same manner as the colonialists. In fact in many places they were worse than the colonialists.

Inchoate democratic structures, hastily erected by the departing colonialists, were perceived by the new leaders as "Western." They were quickly uprooted and replaced with systems that were, in many cases, far more repressive than the hated colonial system...

In most African countries, the elites as a group make up less than 10 percent of the population. Yet

they regard political power as their prerogative and government as their property. Political power is not to be shared with the "backward masses," who are too uneducated to understand such esoterica as "constitutional rights." The elites deem it the responsibility of the government to provide and care for themselves. The government must provide them not only jobs but also everything from houses, cars, refrigerators, television sets, to even their own funerals at subsidized rates. Naturally, to win their political support, African governments have been obliged to grant many of these demands. Moreover, governments themselves are run by the elites. Therefore, providing perks and subsidies to one section of the elite class enables the super elites to grab an even larger piece of the pie for themselves...

Dishonesty, thievery, and speculation pervade the public sector. Public servants embezzle state funds; high-ranking ministers are on the take. The chief bandit is the head of state himself. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire was not satisfied with his personal fortune of \$10 billion; he stole an entire gold-mining region, Kilo-motor, which covers 32,000 square miles and reportedly has reserves of 100 tons of gold...

[I]n Africa, government officials do not serve the people. The African state has been reduced to a mafia-like bazaar, where anyone with an official designation can pillage at will. In effect, it is a "state" that has been hijacked by gangsters, crooks, and scoundrels. They have seized and monopolized both political and economic power to advance their own selfish and criminal interests, not to develop their economies. Their overarching obsession is to amass

Source: George B. N. Ayittey, *Africa Betrayed* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 100, 335–36; George B. N. Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 120–21, 150–52, 248, 343–44.

personal wealth, gaudily displayed in flashy automobiles, fabulous mansions, and a bevy of fawning women. Helping the poor, promoting economic growth, or improving the standard of living of their people is anathema to the ruling elites. “Food for the people!” “People’s power!” “Houses for the masses!” are simply empty slogans that are designed to fool the people and the international community. . . .

. . . [V]irtually all the internal problems emanate from two deadly diseases: sultanism^o and statism.^o While acknowledging that the state or government has a role to play in the development process, the state, as it is conventionally understood, does not exist in Africa. Rather what exists in many African countries is a vampire state—a government hijacked by gangsters, con artists, and scrofulous bandits. . . . Its driving motivation is self-perpetuation in power and self-aggrandizement. Poverty reduction and promotion of economic growth are the least among its priorities. It operates by extracting resources from the productive sections of the population (the peasant majority) and spends it in the urban areas and on the elites—a non-productive, parasitic class.

In country after country, the state has been captured or monopolized by one tiny group—an ethnic group, professional (soldiers), or a religious group—and the instruments of state power and government machinery have been used to advance the economic interests of the ruling group. . . .

In other words, the state vehicle that currently exists in many African countries cannot take Africans on the “development journey” into the twenty-first century. . . .

In the postcolonial period, African governments. . . arrogated onto themselves the power to intervene in almost every conceivable aspect of their economies, ostensibly for “national development” and [to] protect the New African nations against “foreign exploitation.” Subsequently, state controls were used for the benefit of a tiny ruling elite. State hegemony

in the economy became pervasive. The bureaucracy swelled with payrolls padded with government/party supporters. State controls created shortages and opportunities for illicit enrichment by the elites and bred a culture of bribery and corruption. In addition, they killed off the incentive to produce. The state sector became grotesquely inefficient and wasteful. The rot at the government house propelled the military to intervene in politics. . . .

The pervasive control African governments wield over their economies needs to be rolled back. Peasants who produce foodstuffs and cash crops should be allowed to keep a larger portion of their proceeds. Countries that move away from a state-controlled economy toward greater reliance on the private sector generally do better economically. . . .

Privatization (economic reform) seeks to place the vehicle in the hands of the people or the private sector for the simple reason that it would be better taken care of. Evidence for this fact abounds in Africa. In West Africa some of the privately owned “mammy lorries,”^o called *trotros* in Ghana and *mutates* in East Africa, that regularly ply the roads, have been in operation for the past 40 years. By contrast, brand-new buses ordered by African governments barely last six months. . . .

[T]here are a number of ways that aid resources Africa desperately needs can be found in Africa itself. . . .

First, in 1989 Africa was spending \$12 billion annually to import arms and to maintain the military. Second, the elites illegally transferred from Africa at least \$15 billion annually during the latter part of the 1980s. Third, at least \$5 billion annually could be saved if Africa could feed itself. Foreign exchange saved is foreign exchange earned. Fourth, another \$5 billion could be saved from waste and inefficiencies in Africa’s 3,200-odd state enterprises. This might entail selling off some of them or placing them under new management. Fifth, the civil wars raging in Africa exact a heavy toll in lost output, economic development, and destroyed property.

^o **sultanism:** one-man rule.

^o **statism:** government control of the economy.

^o **mammy lorries:** mini-buses.

Using the Evidence: Debating Development in Africa

1. **Defining a controversy:** Based on these documents, identify the major issues that constitute the development debate in post-independence Africa. How do these documents define “development”?
2. **Explaining African economic performance:** What alternative explanations for Africa’s poor economic performance over the past half-century are apparent in these documents? To what extent are those explanations at odds with one another? How might you combine them into a single comprehensive understanding of Africa’s post-independence economic difficulties? What other factors, not mentioned in these documents, might have contributed to those difficulties?
3. **Comparing prescriptions:** What different policy suggestions or overall approaches to African development are suggested or implied by these documents? How might critics challenge the effectiveness or feasibility of these proposals?
4. **Noticing change:** What differences do you see between Documents 23.2 and 23.3, written during the 1960s and 1970s, and the last two documents, composed in the 1980s and 1990s? How would you explain the changes in tone and emphasis?

Visual Sources

Considering the Evidence: Representing Independence



For millions of people in Africa and Asia, the achievement of political independence from European or American domination marked a singular moment in their personal and collective histories. That moment represented a triumph against great odds and an awakening to the possibility of building new lives and new societies. In the words of India's nationalist leader and first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, it was a "tryst with destiny." Both during the struggle and after, the various meanings attributed to independence found visual expression in a proliferation of poster art. Such images served to inspire and mobilize large numbers of people for the tasks ahead, to articulate a vision of the future, and sometimes to celebrate success. Those grand hopes became a baseline from which future generations measured the realities of the post-independence period.

India's independence movement, embodied in the Congress Party and led by the iconic figure of Mahatma Gandhi, was among the first to achieve success as it broke the hold of British colonialism in 1947. It subsequently became an inspiration and a model for many others all across the colonial world and beyond. That success, however, was the product of long decades of hard struggle against British repression, for the colonial power was reluctant to fully accommodate the increasingly forceful demands of the movement. The Indian nationalist struggle was likewise accompanied by serious internal divisions and controversies, and the moment of its greatest victory also witnessed its greatest tragedy—the bloody partition of the country into two states: a Muslim Pakistan and a largely Hindu India (see pp. 1089–90).

Visual Source 23.1 shows a Congress Party poster from the early 1930s in support of Gandhi's policy of nonviolence and noncooperation with British authorities. In "reading" this richly detailed image, it will be useful to notice a number of its major features. In the center is the Tree of Noncooperation; slightly to the right, a British soldier is trying to shake Gandhi's followers out of the tree using a rope labeled "Policy of Repression" with a British colonial jail prominent in the upper right. In the tree are two rival groups of Gandhi's followers, one labeled the "Swarajya (Independence) Party" and the other called the "No-Change Party," a critical reference to those who thought Gandhi was moving too rapidly and aggressively. Two bridges cross the "Gulf of Differences" at left. One leads to the Council Chamber, representing cooperation

with British-created political institutions, while the other leads to the Swarajya Ashram, a center for training young freedom fighters in Gandhi's philosophy of noncooperation. At the bottom left are several blood-stained and quarreling figures labeled "Hindu-Mohammedan friction," while at the upper left three earlier figures in India's nationalist movement overlook the scene below from the clouds.

In the lower right, the female figure labeled Bharat Mata (Mother India) is a Hindu goddess image widely used in Congress Party circles to represent the Indian nation. Her male companion is Krishna, a major Hindu deity, shown pointing toward Gandhi. The quotation above Krishna's head comes from a famous speech that the god made, as recorded in the sacred Hindu text known as the Bhagavad Gita:


The virtuous people to protect, and to destroy the sinful ones,
To set up firmly righteousness, from age to age, I enter birth.

Finally, the red-clad Goddess of Unity in the Tree of Noncooperation seeks to hold together the several factions of Gandhi's movement.

- How does the poster portray British colonial authorities in relationship to Gandhi's movement?
- What kinds of divisions within India's nationalist movement does the poster suggest?
- What does the poster disclose about the role of religion, and particularly Hinduism, in the Indian nationalist movement? How might Muslims have responded to the Hindu religious imagery of the poster?
- How does the poster portray Gandhi and his wife, Kasturbai, the woman in white sitting in front of the small red house? According to the poster, what kind of India was Gandhi seeking after independence?

The freedom struggle in South Africa was led by the African National Congress (ANC), a political organization that was founded in 1912 and finally came to power in 1994. Over those decades, its strategy evolved from polite elite protest to confrontational mass campaigns and from a commitment to open and peaceful means to a selective embrace of underground organization and armed struggle. Throughout its history, the ANC held generally to the goal of a democratic and multiracial society. Visual Source 23.2, an undated ANC poster, shows the organization's flag and various symbols of its long struggle. The colors of the flag depict South Africa's resources: black for the vast majority of its population, green for its rich land, and yellow for the gold that had long provided a basis for the country's wealth.

- Does the poster reflect the ANC's earlier, more peaceful and elite-based politics or its later, more aggressive posture? On what do you base your conclusion?



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Non-Co-operation tree and Mahatma Gandhi.

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गुरदारी रस्ता लाहौर।

منشی آرٹ گیلری لاہور

Visual Source 23.1 Non-Co-operation Tree and Mahatma Gandhi (© British Library Board, PIB 170/2)

- How might you understand the wheel, the fist, the spear, and the shield shown on the poster? Why do you think the poster used these traditional weapons rather than modern rifles?
- Notice the mass march that provides the background to the poster's primary images. What message does this convey?
- Pay attention to the several red flags, representing the South African Communist Party, among the crowd. What posture toward communism is suggested by these flags? Keep in mind that the Communist Party was a longtime ally of the ANC.
- How might white, Indian, and mixed-race ("colored") supporters of the ANC react to this poster? How might white advocates of apartheid respond to it?



Visual Source 23.2 African National Congress (Special Collections, Senate House Library, University of London)

In Vietnam, the struggle for independence was a prolonged process and took place against a variety of enemies. French colonial rule had prompted various kinds of resistance since the late nineteenth century. Then Japanese occupation of the country during World War II stimulated the formation of a nationalist party known as the Viet Minh, dominated by a communist party and led by Ho Chi Minh. After Japan's defeat in World War II, that movement continued as an effort to oust the French, which succeeded by 1954. At that point, Vietnam was divided between the communist-dominated North Vietnam and the U.S.-backed South Vietnam. What followed was a twenty-year effort by North Vietnam and communist supporters in the south to reunify their country and to drive out the American military forces, which numbered over a half million by the mid-1960s.

By 1975, the North Vietnamese had succeeded (see Map 23.1, p. 1084). It was a stunning reversal for the American superpower and an equally stunning triumph for the small Southeast Asian country. While the reasons for this



Visual Source 23.3 Vietnamese Independence and Victory over the United States (Laurie Steelink/Track16/SmartArt, Inc.)

surprising turn of events have been debated ever since, it was clearly of enormous significance for Vietnamese understandings of their national independence. Visual Source 23.3 presents a Vietnamese poster, dating from somewhere between 1965 and 1975, that celebrates one aspect of that unlikely achievement. The caption reads: “Bravo for Hanoi’s Tremendous Victory When 23 B-52s Were Shot Down!”

- How does this poster present the struggle against the United States?
- In what way does it anticipate or celebrate the victory over the United States? What meaning does it attach to that victory? How might you understand the flowers that the soldier is holding and the small pagoda in the upper left?
- What other perspectives on this victory for national independence can you imagine? Consider various viewpoints within the United States as well as those of the anticommunist elements in Vietnamese society.


The establishment of the independent state of Israel in 1948 marked an enormous victory for Jewish people that took on rich meaning for them in many contexts. The most historically significant context no doubt lay in the return of widely scattered Jewish people to the ancient biblical homeland from which so many Jews had fled or been expelled by various foreign rulers—Babylonian, Assyrian, Roman, Byzantine, and Crusader European. Since the first century C.E., the majority of the world's Jews had lived in diaspora in the Middle East, North Africa, or Europe, with smaller numbers retaining a Jewish presence in what was then called Palestine. For those whose families had long lived in exile, the opportunity to return to an authentically Jewish state in the area comprising the ancient Land of Israel must have seemed miraculous.

A more immediate context for the establishment of Israel was that of the Zionist movement, formally initiated in Europe in 1897 with the goal of creating a “home for the Jewish people in Palestine.” It was a response to the racism and anti-Semitism of European culture, and it drew upon currents of nationalist thinking then surging across Europe. A major expression of Zionism lay in growing Jewish emigration to their ancient homeland, especially during the 1920s and 1930s and even more so in the several years following World War II. During that war some 6 million Jews perished in Nazi death camps as Hitler sought to rid Europe of a Jewish presence. Many among those who survived the Holocaust sought refuge and security in a land of their own.

Two major obstacles confronted these Jewish emigrants. One was British control of Palestine, granted to Great Britain as a mandate of the League of Nations following World War I. While the British favored the eventual creation of a Jewish state, they also feared antagonizing their Arab allies by allowing unfettered Jewish immigration. The second obstacle was opposition from the Arab majority of Palestine, who feared not only the loss of their land as Jewish settlers bought up growing amounts of it but also the loss of their cultural identity as Muslims in what they feared would become a Jewish land. The creation of Israel in 1948, with support from the United Nations, marked the triumph of Zionism and a victory over both British imperialism and Arab resistance.

Visual Source 23.4 shows a Zionist poster created around 1940 and intended to encourage emigration to the Land of Israel and to persuade donors to contribute money for the purchase of land in Palestine. It was titled “Redeem the Land,” a reference to the Zionist goal of using up-to-date farming techniques to provide the agricultural basis for a modern society.¹⁰

- What features of the poster contributed to the Zionists' message?
- Why do you think the land is shown without any people?
- How do you understand the contrast between the richly plowed land and the adjacent barren areas? What image of the new Israel does this poster project?



Visual Source 23.4 Winning a Jewish National State (The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem)

- The fruits on the left side of the poster reflect the biblical description of “promised land” as recorded in Deuteronomy 8:7–10. What is their function in the poster?

If the establishment of Israel as an independent state was a great triumph for Jewish nationalism, it was a disaster for Arabs in general and Palestinian Arabs in particular. In the decades that followed, Israel and various Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, for example) went to war repeatedly. The so-called Six Day War of 1967 brought under Israeli control additional Palestinian land, including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, areas now known as the Palestinian Territories.

At the same time, the Arabs of Palestine, both within Israel and in the adjacent territories, were developing a distinct national identity of their own. Many of them had lost their land and had lived for several generations as refugees in overcrowded camps in neighboring countries or territories where they were dependent on services provided by the United Nations. Almost all Palestinians felt oppressed, constrained, or discriminated against by Israeli authorities. Their emerging national identity found expression in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964. Initially the PLO called for the complete liberation of Palestine from Zionist colonialism, but by the late 1980s the organization had implicitly recognized the right of Israel to exist and sought a “two-state solution” with an independent Palestine and Israel living side by side.

Achieving even a limited Palestinian state, however, has proved extraordinarily difficult. In pursuit of their national goals, Palestinians have conducted raids, suicide bombing missions, and rocket attacks on Israel from camps in neighboring territories and on several occasions have organized large-scale violent resistance movements known as *intifada*. For its part, Israel has launched highly destructive large-scale military actions in the Palestinian territories, imposed economic blockades that have brought immense suffering to Palestinians, built walls and fences that have disrupted the normal movement of Palestinians, and continued to enlarge the Jewish settlements, especially in the West Bank. Both sides have presented their actions as largely defensive and reactive to the provocations of the other. They have also engaged in periodic negotiations with each other, but those efforts have thus far foundered on unbridgeable differences as to the size and nature of a future Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their lands in Israel. Divisions among Palestinians have also hampered their movement, particularly the recent rivalry between the PLO and Hamas, an Islamic organization with both welfare and political/military functions.

Like other peoples seeking an independent state, Palestinians have represented their struggles in posters such as Visual Source 23.5, created by the Palestinian artist Abdel Rahman Al Muzain in 1984. Featuring a Palestinian



Visual Source 23.5 A Palestinian Nation in the Making (Palestine Poster Project Archives/ Visual Connection Archive)

farmer, it was undertaken to commemorate Land Day, an annual observance of the occasion in 1976 when six Palestinians were killed in demonstrations against Israeli confiscation of their land.¹¹

- How might you read this poster as a response to the Israeli poster in Visual Source 23.4?
- What significance would you attach to the posture and the traditional clothing of the farmer? Why do you think the artist depicted him with a pickax rather than a rifle?
- What message is conveyed by the rows of traditional houses on the hillside behind the farmer?
- What expectations for the future does the poster imply? Consider the meaning of the doves between the feet and on the shoulder of the farmer as well as the sun's swirling rays that seem to link the earth and sky.

Using the Evidence: Representing Independence

1. **Making comparisons:** Movements of national independence can be defined by the conditions they were opposing as well as the kind of future they were seeking. With these two criteria in mind, what similarities and what differences can you identify among these visual sources and the movements they represented?
2. **Defining points of view:** How would you identify the point of view that each of these visual sources conveys? Can you imagine a visual source with an alternative point of view for each of them?
3. **Seeking meaning in visual sources:** How do visual sources such as these help to illuminate the meaning of national independence? In what ways are they limited as sources of evidence for historians?